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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Travis Shane Anderson pled guilty to one count of 1st degree kidnapping, a
violation of Idaho Code §18-4501(1), and 1 count of Aggravated Battery, a violation of
Idaho Code §18-903, 18-907(1)(a).

The parties had entered into a binding plea

agreement whereby the total scope of the unified sentence was agreed upon, while the
parties retained the limited ability to argue the fixed or determinate portion of the
sentence, from an agreed-upon range of 12 to 15 years.
The District Court sentenced Mr. Anderson to a fixed term of 14 years, with an
indeterminate term of 18 years, which was within the Rule 11 plea agreement.
The District Court failed to sufficiently consider all of the mitigating factors
present in this case – most notably, that Mr. Anderson accepted responsibility and
expressed remorse for his crime, had severe substance abuse issues, had no prior felony
record and no significant prior criminal history, was sentenced more harshly than his
more culpable co-defendant, and had significant untreated mental health issues. Based on
these failures, Mr. Anderson asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in
imposing the fourteen year determinate portion of the sentence.
Mr. Anderson submits that the District Court abused its discretion and acted in
manifest disregard of Idaho law, when the Court failed to require a comprehensive mental
health evaluation in accordance with Idaho Code §§19-2522 and -2523.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State issued a Criminal Complaint against Mr. Anderson on or about
November 27, 2015, charging him with one count of First Degree Kidnapping and one
6

count of Aggravated Battery. (R., ps. 62-63). Mr. Anderson waived his Preliminary
Hearing. The State filed an Information on December 23, 2015, containing the same two
charges as the Complaint. (R., ps. 79-80).
Mr. Anderson pled guilty to, along with co-defendant Angela Frisby, having
confined the victim Kisha Munson, with the intent to cause her to be secretly confined or
imprisoned, for the purpose of obtaining money, property or any other thing of value for
her return. Mr. Anderson also pled guilty to repeatedly beating Ms. Munson with his
hands and feet, again in concert with Ms. Frisby, causing great bodily harm. (See R., ps.
92-93). The victim had admitted to stealing Mr. Anderson’s car, which contained all of
the items he and his girlfriend had purchased for the pending birth of their child. (See
S.H. Tr., p 30, ls. 8-13; PSR, p. 3, para. 2).
Mr. Anderson changed his plea to guilty on both charges, on April 8, 2016, based
on a written “Pretrial Settlement Offer” signed by the parties. (See R., p. 91). The Court
scheduled the case for sentencing on June 2, 2016, ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report (“PSR”), and ordered a GAIN assessment. The GAIN assessment recommended
mental health services for Mr. Anderson.

The Department of Health and Welfare

conducted a “review” of the GAIN’s mental health findings, and also recommended
further treatment. (PSR, p. 80-81).
The District Court sentenced Mr. Anderson on August 11, 2016. The Court
imposed a unified sentence of thirty-two years, with fourteen years fixed and eighteen
years indeterminate. (R., ps. 106, 108-09). The Court issued an Amended Judgment on
March 8, 2017, and again on March 10, 2017. Mr. Anderson timely appeals from the
District Court’s Amended Judgment. (R., p. 143).

7

ISSUES
1.
Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive
unified sentence of thirty-two years, with fourteen years fixed, upon Mr. Anderson
following his pleas of guilty?
2.
Whether the District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible error
when it failed to require a comprehensive mental health evaluation of Mr. Anderson for
sentencing?

8

ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Unified
Sentence Of Thirty-two Years, With Fourteen Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Anderson
Following His Plea Of Guilty.

A.

Introduction
Travis Anderson did not proceed to trial, but rather pled guilty prior to trial. He

accepted responsibility for his conduct and pled guilty to one count of First Degree
Kidnapping and one count of Aggravated Battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the
parties stipulated to the total term of the sentence, with discretion to argue for between
twelve and fifteen years on the determinate portion of the sentence. (R., p. 91). At
sentencing, the Government recommended a sentence of fifteen years determinate and
seventeen years indeterminate. (R., p. 90, 91; S. H. Tr., p. 19, ls. 5-7). The defense
recommended a sentence of twelve years determinate, and twenty years indeterminate.
(R., p. 90; S.H. Tr., p. 32, ls. 24-25; p. 33, ls. 14-15).
Following Mr. Anderson’s plea of guilty, the District Court sentenced him to a
unified sentence of thirty-two (32) years, with fourteen (14) years determinate, on the
Kidnapping charge, and a twelve (12) year determinate sentence on the Aggravated
Battery charge, to run concurrently. (R. 106, 108-09).
Several mitigating factors were present in Mr. Anderson’s case, all of which
indicated that a more lenient determinate sentence would have been appropriate. Those
included the fact that Mr. Anderson accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his
actions, had no prior violent felony record or record of similar charges, his more-culpable
co-defendant was sentenced to a ten year determinate and fifteen year indeterminate term,

9

he had severe substance abuse issues, and he suffered from significant mental health
issues.
The District Court’s insufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors, and
therefore, its insufficient consideration of Idaho’s recognized sentencing objectives,
caused it to impose an excessive determinate sentence in an abuse of its discretion. This
Court should remedy that abuse.

B.

The District Court Failed To Sufficiently Consider The Mitigating Factors Present
In This Case And So Imposed An Excessive Determinate Sentence.
1.

Introduction

Mr. Anderson asserts that, given the facts and circumstances of the case and his
background, his unified sentence of thirty-two years, with fourteen years fixed, was
excessive. When a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 896 (1999)(citing State
v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982)).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, the appellate courts utilize an “abuse of
discretion” standard. State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 794 (2016)(citing State v. AlKotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 70 (2005)). The appellate court must conduct an independent
review of the record on appeal. State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76 (2002)(citing State v.
Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 73 (2002)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a
sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse
of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho 293, 294 (1997)(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).
10

Mr.

Anderson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; therefore, he
must show that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. Id.
When considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court must
consider (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 890 (2017)(citing State v. McIntosh,
160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016)); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008). In order to reach a
decision “by an exercise of reason”, the court must take into consideration “facts and
circumstances which are necessary to make a sound, fair and just determination, and a
knowledge of the facts upon which the discretion may properly operate.” Bailey, supra.
(citing State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 611 (1991)).

Mr. Anderson asserts that the

District Court failed to engage in such an “exercise of reason”, based on the Court’s
statement that “you’re still left with simply numbers” and “it’s just talking about
numbers” (S.H. Tr., p. 37, ls. 1-2; p. 41, l. 16), and based on the factors discussed below
in detail.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show
that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of
the facts. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145
(1991)); State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727 (Idaho 2007).
The governing criteria, or criminal sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho
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at 70; State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460-61 (2002). The protection of society is the
primary objective the sentencing court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho
497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the
other objectives will generally be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). For purposes of sentencing review, the Court will consider the
minimum period of incarceration as the probable measure of confinement. State v.
Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836 (2000). In Mr. Anderson’s case, the minimum period of
incarceration is fourteen years.
In

exercising

its

discretion,

the

“most

fundamental

requirement

is

reasonableness”. Bailey, 161 Idaho at 894; McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8; Hooper, 119 Idaho
at 608 (citing State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 724 (1979)).
The appellate court should consider several factors to determine whether the
sentencing objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho
318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to “the defendant’s good character,
status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to
treatment, and support of family1.” Id.; see also I.C. §19-2521 (wherein the Legislature
articulated several factors it suggested the sentencing court consider in its determination
of whether to place the defendant on probation, or whether the facts indicate that it should
depart from that result and impose a prison sentence).
Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more lenient
sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App.

1

Mr. Anderson had clear and strong support from his family, as demonstrated by their
heartfelt testimony on the record at his Sentencing Hearing. (See S.H. Tr., p. 13, l. 16 –
p. 18, l. 3). This factor was clearly met in Mr. Anderson’s case.
12

2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho
348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State
v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those factors were
present, but were insufficiently considered by the District Court when it determined Mr.
Anderson’s sentence, particularly the determinate portion of his sentence. As a result, his
sentence did not serve the recognized sentencing objectives and was excessive.
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. The Eighth
Amendment prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits
not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 2008). In addition to the
statutory arguments submitted herein, Mr. Anderson also asserts that his determinate
sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being greater than necessary to
accomplish the goals and objectives of sentencing and by being disproportionate to his
crime, and therefore constituted “cruel and unusual punishment”. This Court should
remedy any constitutional violations by correcting the determinate portion of Mr.
Anderson’s sentence.
2.

Lack of Prior Record

One of the enumerated factors under Idaho law indicating prison is inappropriate
(lack of a prior record) directly applied to Mr. Anderson’s case. See I.C. §19-2521(2)(g).
This was Mr. Anderson’s first felony conviction, albeit a serious felony. His
misdemeanor record consisted of a marijuana possession charge and a Petit Theft charge.
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His marijuana charge was from 2008, approximately eight years before this case. His
Petit Theft charge was from 2010, some six years before this case.
Neither of Mr. Anderson’s prior convictions was for crimes of violence. Mr.
Anderson had no prior history of violent offenses, drug-related offenses, or sexual-related
crimes. He does not have a record of victimizing other people or endangering society.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously considered the fact that the defendant
had no felony record to be a mitigating factor which partially justified a more lenient
sentence. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982); see also I.C.
§ 19-2521(1)(f), (2)(g) (indicating that where the defendant does not have a significant
record, the sentencing court should be more disposed to suspending the sentence rather
than opting for imprisonment). The logic in support of this proposition is that such a
person usually does not yet have a fixed character for crime and therefore rehabilitation at
this early stage is more likely. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971).
The Idaho Supreme Court provided significant guidance on this issue in State v.
Shideler, supra. In Shideler, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of armed robbery,
while charges of assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime were dismissed. The district court sentenced the defendant to an
indeterminate term of twenty years. Shildeler, 103 Idaho at 593.
The Supreme Court reviewed the sentence under an “abuse of discretion”
standard, and overturned the sentence. The Court found that the crime was very serious
and threatened harm to others, and that a “substantial sentence of imprisonment” was
required, both for protection of society and to “reflect society’s condemnation of the
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defendant’s behavior” and for general deterrence. Id. at 594. However, the Court looked
closely at the defendant’s personal characteristics, noting specifically that the defendant
had no prior criminal history and had severe mental health issues. Id.
The Supreme Court overturned the twenty-year indeterminate sentence imposed
upon the convicted robber. The Court noted that
“this was the defendant’s first felony with no prior history of any
criminal activity and this court has ‘recognized that the first
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the
habitual criminal.’” Id. (citing State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402
(1953)(overruled on other grounds)).
The Court further noted that the defendant had accepted responsibility for his acts,
and reduced his sentence from an indeterminate twenty year sentence to an indeterminate
twelve year sentence, a time reduction of forty percent. Id. at 595.
Mr. Anderson asserts that the Shideler case should guide this Court in its
assessment of his appeal. The Shideler case provides guidance for several reasons,
including the similarities in the defendant’s mental health issues as well as their mutual
acceptance of responsibility. It should be noted, of course, that Mr. Shideler obtained a
sentence reduction on appeal despite having committed a violent offense which
apparently involved use of a deadly weapon, while Mr. Anderson’s offense did not
contemplate or threaten him using a deadly weapon against the victim. Finally, the
Shideler Court placed great significance on the lack of a prior record, similar to Mr.
Anderson. See id. at 595. Mr. Anderson urges this Court to give great weight to the
Shideler decision.
Mr. Anderson’s limited and non-felony criminal record, along with his
willingness to accept responsibility for his actions, indicated that a more lenient sentence
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was appropriate. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-2521(1)(f), (2)(g); Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; State
v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988). Based thereon, Mr. Anderson asserts that
the District Court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive determinate sentence.
3.

Acceptance of Responsibility

Mr. Anderson accepted responsibility for his actions, by pleading guilty and
admitting his behavior. He also expressed his remorse, indicating his sorrow and remorse
directly to the victim during the sentencing hearing. (See S.H. Tr., ps. 33-34)(stating
verbatim that

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
“I just want to say that I do sincerely feel remorseful for what
happened. I want to apologize to the victim, to the community, to my
family and everyone affected by this.” (Id., p. 33, l. 24 – p. 34, l. 2)
***
“… there’s nothing that [the prosecutor] can say that can make me feel
worse about what I did. As talented as [the prosecutor] is [at] painting
a picture, I feel that much worse.”
***
“”This is horrific. I understand that. And so I would just ask that you
would … have some sort of mercy on me to see that I truly am
remorseful for my actions and accountable for what I’ve done.” (Id.,
p. 33, l. 24 – p. 34, l.2; p. 34, ls. 6 – 8; p. 34, ls. 12-15).
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are
critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App.
2010), rev. denied. By making these acknowledgements, Mr. Anderson demonstrated
that he had taken these critical first steps. They also demonstrated that he was and is
amenable to treatment. (See S.H. Tr., p. 34, ls. 10-12). Mr. Anderson also freely
admitted that he needed drug treatment. (P.S.R., p. 13)(stating that “Mr. Anderson
indicated feeling drug treatment is necessary”).
Additionally, Mr. Anderson’s acknowledgment of guilt and his acceptance of
responsibility, and expressions of remorse, satisfy a statutory factor “in favor of avoiding
16

a sentence of imprisonment.”

(See Idaho Code §19-2521(2)).

Specifically, Mr.

Anderson’s “character and attitudes … indicate that the commission of another crime is
unlikely.”

Id. at 2(i).

As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized

“acceptance of responsibility” as an important factor in considering whether to reduce a
substantial sentence. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 593.
The Idaho Court of Appeals fairly recently overturned an excessive sentence
based in part on the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, in Cook v. State, 145 Idaho
482 (Ct. App. 2008). In Cook, the defendant pled guilty to nine counts of grand theft by
deception, having defrauded nine different families out of 1.5 million dollars. He was
sentenced to eight consecutive prison terms of three-to-eight years. The Court of Appeals
considered the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, the circumstances of the offense,
the fact that the charges arose from one continuing plan of wrongdoing, the defendant’s
age, and his complete lack of a prior criminal record. Id. at 489. The Court found the
sentence to be excessive, holding that “… the court did not give sufficient consideration
to the defendant’s status as a first time offender, his expressions of remorse, [and] the
likelihood of rehabilitation and deterrence possible with a lesser cumulative sentence …
.” Id.
Mr. Anderson asserts that the Cook Court engaged in an appropriate weighing of
all of the various factors at play, including the goals and objectives of sentencing under
Idaho law, and came to a well-reasoned decision. Most importantly, Mr. Anderson notes
that the factors considered by the Cook Court - acceptance of responsibility, the
circumstances of the offense, the fact that the charges arose from one continuing plan of
wrongdoing, the defendant’s age, and his virtual lack of a prior criminal record – directly
17

apply to his case and personal circumstances. Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that
this Court adopt the Cook rationale, apply it to his case, and reduce the fixed portion of
his sentence from fourteen years down to twelve years, as this Court deems appropriate.
Mr. Anderson’s acknowledgment of guilt, his expression of remorse, and
acceptance of responsibility indicate a more lenient fixed sentence was more appropriate.
See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815. The District Court erred by failing to properly consider this
factor in imposing an excessive sentence upon Mr. Anderson.
4.

Substance Abuse and Childhood History

Yet another mitigating factor supported a more lenient sentence. Mr. Anderson
had a serious substance abuse issue before and during the time of his criminal behavior.
(See PSR, ps. 13, 75-76; S.H. Tr., p. 34, ls. 10-12).
This substance abuse began at a young age, during Mr. Anderson’s adolescence,
and included Mr. Anderson being exposed to his parents engaging in alcohol abuse and
drug usage. (See PSR, p. 7). A troubled childhood is yet another factor sentencing courts
should consider in mitigation. See State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App.
2001).
Mr. Anderson reported during his PSR interview that his alcohol and drug usage
began at approximately age 12, and continued up to the date of his arrest. (See PSR, ps.
11-12).
Mr. Anderson further reported that he began using methamphetamine at age 14,
and was a regular daily user for years leading up to his arrest in this case. (See PSR, p.
13). Finally, Mr. Anderson reported that he used cocaine, ecstasy, LSD and heroin as
well. (Id). However, despite this clear record of substance abuse, the District Court
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apparently gave no consideration to this factor at sentencing, failing to even mention it
during the Court’s comments in support of its sentence. (See S.H. Tr., p. 34, l. 23- p. 42,
l. 24). This failure to recognize and consider Mr. Anderson’s “troubled childhood”, as
concerns drug abuse and addiction, constitutes error. While this factor does not provide a
legal defense or excuse for Mr. Anderson’s behavior, it certainly represented a mitigating
factor that the District Court should have considered. See Williamson, supra.
This Court should reverse for further proceedings to properly account for these
mitigating factors.
5.

Mental Health Issues

Finally, compounding those issues, Mr. Anderson had significant mental health
issues which the District Court gave little or no heed to in imposing its sentence. Mr.
Anderson has been diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Depressive Disorder,
and Agoraphobia (‘without history of panic disorder”). Mr. Anderson’s PSR clearly
referenced his mental health issues. (See PSR, ps. 11, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80-81).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code §19-2523 not only
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a
sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). For at least one year prior
to his arrest, and likely longer, although the evaluations focused only on the prior twelve
months,

Mr. Anderson reported that such symptoms affected his behavior.

(See,

generally, PSR p. 80-81). In fact, in order to address these issues in relation to his
behavior, the GAIN evaluator and the Mental Health Screening reporter both
recommended that he potentially receive future mental health treatment and services. (Id.
at ps. 79, 81).
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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Again, despite a clear record of mental health issues, the District Court apparently
gave no consideration to this factor at sentencing, as the Court never mentioned mental
health matters during the Court’s comments in support of its sentence. (See S.H. Tr., p.
34, l. 23- p. 42, l. 24).
Given that the District Court failed to mention or reference mental health issues at
Mr. Anderson’s sentencing hearing, the record is void of any explanation as to whether
they entered into the Court’s consideration. Mr. Anderson asserts that the District Court
committed error by failing to properly consider his mental health issues at sentencing,
and urges this Court to remand his case to remedy this error.
6.

Sentence Greater Than Necessary To Accomplish Sentencing Goals

Mr. Anderson further asserts that the determinate portion of his sentence was
greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Such a sentence was
inappropriate because sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison
system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk
of recidivism.

Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639

(Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Anderson was only 28 years old when he was sentenced. (PSR, p.
1). Yet his sentence, if it stands, would ensure that he will be incarcerated for at least
fourteen years (half the length of his entire life to date) regardless of his rehabilitative
efforts or maturation during that time. As such, his sentence operates contrary to the
admonitions in Cook and Eubank and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The Idaho Court of Appeals provided guidance on this issue in State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348 (Ct. App. 1988). In Carrasco, the Court of Appeals reviewed a sentence
of thirty years indeterminate for heroin and cocaine delivery charges. The prosecution
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had recommended a sentence of ten years determinate. Relying in part on the fact that
the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation was ignored and that instead, “the district
judge went a step further” and imposed a thirty year sentence, the Court of Appeals
overturned the sentence, and reduced it by a third. Id. at 354. The Carrasco Court noted
that the reduced sentence would provide “correctional authorities greater flexibility in
granting [the defendant] a parole, if and when he earn[ed] it.” Id. at 355. Mr. Anderson
urges this Court to adopt the logic of the Carrasco decision and apply it directly to the
facts in his case.
Mr. Anderson further notes the significant discrepancy in sentencing among the
three participants in this matter. Participant Angela Frisby received a sentence of ten
years fixed, followed by fifteen years indeterminate. (See Kootenai County case no. CR2015-19465). It is believed that participant Lilly Johnson was sentenced to mental health
court after a period of retained jurisdiction.

Mr. Anderson acknowledges that Ms.

Johnson played a lesser role in the crime. However, Mr. Frisby was, at minimum,
equally culpable, if not more culpable, in that Ms. Frisby actually detained and kidnapped
the victim from inside a store.

(PSR, p. 3, para. 3)(stating that “[r]egarding the

kidnapping, Ms. Munson stated she was dragged out of a Spokane store by a woman later
identified as Angela Frisby”). The District Court did not find that Mr. Anderson played a
greater role, noting that “I’m not so sure that the Court is persuaded one way or another
whether or not you were in charge … .” (S.H. Tr., p. 38, ls. 1-2).
Regardless, co-defendant Frisby received a significantly lesser sentence, both in
the fixed and indeterminate portions. In light of the sentencing goals and the general
directive to ensure sentences are relatively fair and equal for similar conduct, Mr.
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Anderson challenges his sentence. The District Court’s sentence created unwarranted
sentencing disparity among similarly culpable defendants. Based thereon, he asserts that
the District Court abused its discretion by imposing the 14-year determinate portion of
the sentence.
Summary
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient
determinate sentence still addresses all the other sentencing objectives – protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence.

See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713

(1993)(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives).
In Mr. Anderson’s case, if the sentencing court had imposed the determinate
sentence term recommended by the defense, it would still have imposed a substantial
prison sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed
sentence would still be present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App.
2008)(discussing how a sentence for a period of probation and retained jurisdiction,
rather than prison, addressed all the sentencing objectives and how the court’s continuing
jurisdiction affected those objectives). However, the sentence would not be “longer than
reasonably necessary to deter similar conduct in the future, to exact retribution, or to
protect society.” Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 355.
In addition to the twelve-year minimum term of imprisonment, the Idaho Board of
Pardons and Parole would retain the ability to revoke Mr. Anderson’s parole and execute
the original sentence if Mr. Anderson were to fail to adhere to the terms of his parole
upon his release from prison. However, it could do so knowing that each of the statutory
sentencing objectives had been properly addressed initially at the sentencing phase.
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

22

Based upon these factors, Mr. Anderson asserts that the District Court
insufficiently considered all the mitigating factors, which led to its imposition of an
excessive determinate sentence in an abuse of its discretion. See Dabney, 159 Idaho at
794; Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 70.

Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court

remand this case with instructions to remedy that abuse of discretion.

II. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Order A Mental
Health Evaluation Of Mr. Lamb Prior To Sentencing.
Mr. Anderson’s mental health status was a significant factor at sentencing. (It
apparently remains a significant factor in that the State of Idaho placed Mr. Anderson at
the Orofino facility, which treats persons with “dual diagnosis” mental health and drug
addiction issues, as noted in this Court’s notices to Mr. Anderson prior to Counsel’s
appearance). The District Court failed to specifically mention Mr. Anderson’s mental
health issues during sentencing. (See, generally, S.H. Tr. p. 34, l. 23 - p. 42, l. 24). Mr.
Anderson’s PSR specifically referenced his mental health issues, and the PSR
attachments included specific mental health diagnoses. (See PSR, ps. 11, 74, 76, 77, 79,
80-81).

Nonetheless, the District Court proceeded forward at sentencing without a

separate, specific comprehensive mental health evaluation.
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C. §19-2522 is discretionary. State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (Ct. App. 2010).
However, as with any exercise of discretion, the district court’s determination must be
consistent with applicable legal standards. Id. “The legal standards governing the court’s
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-
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2522.” State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007).

Idaho Code §19-2522

provides that a mental health evaluation is mandatory if there is reason to believe that the
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good
cause shown. State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland,
125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1994).
Mr. Anderson’s counsel did not object to the lack of a psychological or mental
health evaluation in accordance with I.C. §19-2522 prior to the District Court’s judgment
of conviction. However, a district court is under an independent duty to order a mental
health evaluation under I.C. §19-2522 under certain circumstances, even in absence of a
request on the part of the defendant or his counsel. “A claim that the district court abused
its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation of a defendant
before sentencing can be made on appeal without an objection to the lack of an
evaluation or a request for an evaluation before the district court.” State v. Durham, 146
Idaho 364, 366 (Ct. App. 2008). In that situation, the defendant must demonstrate that
the district court manifestly disregarded the relevant provisions of Idaho Criminal Rule
32 by failing to order the psychological examination. Id. If the record indicates that a
defendant’s mental condition and rehabilitative potential are significant factors, the
district court should not proceed to sentencing “without the benefit of a professional
diagnosis of that condition and prognosis for improvement,” all of which support a
finding under I.C. §19-2522 that a mental health evaluation is required. See McFarland,
125 Idaho at 881.
The analysis under I.C. § 19-2522 focuses on factors relevant to appropriate
punishment, such as the degree of the defendant’s illness and level of impairment, which
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may impact upon the defendant’s overall culpability for the offense; the available
treatments for his condition, along with the risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment; and a consideration of the risk of danger that the defendant might pose if
released back into the community. I.C. §19-2522(3).
The evidence before the District Court at Mr. Anderson’s sentencing failed to
address nearly all of the critical factors that are required to be included within a mental
health evaluation for sentencing purposes. Unfortunately, the PSR contained limited
mental health information for Mr. Anderson, as it was based on a GAIN assessment and a
limited mental health screening report only. (See generally, PSR, ps. 74, 76, 77, 79, 8081).
Further, the PSR author was aware of Mr. Anderson’s mental health issues,
having referenced the topic specifically in the body of Anderson’s PSR. (See PSR, p.
11). Despite clear indications in the PSR that Mr. Anderson had significant mental health
issues, the District Court made no mention of these issues during Mr. Anderson’s
sentencing hearing. (See, generally, S.H. Tr., p. 34, l. 23 – p. 42, l. 24). This was error.
Unfortunately, the District Court compounded this error by not following up on
the information available to it through the pre-sentence process, and requiring a
comprehensive mental health evaluation. This omission clearly violates the dictates of
Idaho Code §19-2522, which requires a court to consider such an evaluation under Mr.
Anderson’s circumstances.
Since there was no mental health evaluation, it follows that there was no
evaluation of what treatments were potentially available to Mr. Anderson in order to
address his mental conditions, or any evaluation of the potential risk to the public if
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Mr. Anderson were to receive mental health treatment in lieu of additional fixed
incarceration. (See Idaho Code §19-2522(3)).
The information available to the District Court prior to sentencing made it clear
that there was reason to believe that Mr. Anderson’s mental condition would be a
significant factor at sentencing. However, the information properly available to the
District Court did not adequately meet the requirements of I.C. §19-2522(3). In light of
this, the District Court acted with manifest disregard for the provisions of Idaho Code
§19-2522 and 2523, and Idaho Criminal Rule 32, when it failed to order a psychological
report or comprehensive mental health evaluation for sentencing purposes. This Court
should remedy this error and remand the case accordingly.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above and foregoing, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this
Court reduce the fixed or determinate portion of his sentence as it deems appropriate.
In the alternative, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence, and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation
of Mr. Anderson’s mental health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522
and I.C.R. 32.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2017.

_/s/ Paul E. Riggins____________
PAUL E. RIGGINS
Attorney for Appellant
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